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Planning for a Future of Asset-Based Welfare? 
New Labour, Financialized Economic Agency 





This article focuses on core aspects of the political economy of New Labour and 
surveys the strategic priorities to which it is likely the planning process will have to 
adapt.  As with other policy areas, the effects of enhanced Treasury micro-
management of the Government’s reform agenda has begun to impact upon the field 
of planning.  The prime example in this respect is the Treasury’s preference for 
replacing state provision of welfare-enhancing services with the move towards an 
individualized system of asset-based welfare.  The article begins with an analysis of 
this shift, showing how it is dependent on creating financialized economic agents who 
think instinctively as active saver-investors in their quest to accumulate assets to fund 
future consumption of welfare.  In contemporary Britain the housing market 
dominates the accumulation of assets amongst everyday saver-investors.  The article 
concludes by analysing the possible tension that will be introduced into the planning 
process because of New Labour’s twin goals: (1) to defend the current value of asset 
wealth even as the mortgage lending market has stalled and confidence in the stability 
of house prices has temporarily evaporated; and (2) to restrict exclusion from private 
ownership in the housing market so that broadening access can be used to propel a 
universal move towards an individualized system of asset-based welfare.  The fallout 
from the world credit crunch which began in the autumn of 2007 and remains ongoing 
at the time of writing in January 2009 looks likely to exacerbate what was always a 




The difficulties that befell Britain’s Northern Rock bank in September 2007 revealed 
both the successes and the fragilities of the political economy of New Labour.1
The most memorable image in the whole episode was the sight of large queues 
of Northern Rock customers waiting, in increasingly agitated fashion, to close their 
accounts and withdraw their savings from the bank.  Senior Northern Rock officials 
sought to head off a self-fulfilling panic by blitzing the media with statistics to show 
that the bank’s core business was still highly profitable and that there were 
consequently no concerns for its solvency.  Their argument was that customers were 
being collectively irrational in seeking individually to reclaim their savings: if they 
were to leave their money where it was then the bank could continue to function 
normally without threat to the value of customers’ holdings, but by withdrawing their 
savings customers were eroding the bank’s short-term assets, in turn heightening the 
potential for a full-blown liquidity crisis and the loss of remaining Northern Rock 
  At 
that time, Northern Rock was the fifth largest mortgage lender in the UK, capitalizing 
new mortgage debt in the first half of 2007 alone equivalent to roughly 2% of UK 
GDP (calculated from www.statistics.gov.uk).  Yet, it became the first British bank 
since the 1970s to activate lender of last resort facilities at the Bank of England as it 
got caught up in the credit crunch which immobilized inter-bank money market 
functions over that summer.  More notably, it became the first depository institution 
in Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century to suffer genuine ‘run on the 
bank’ dynamics, as customers withdrew over £2 billion in private deposits in a critical 
two-day period over September 14th/15th (Observer, 16.09.07). 
                                                 
1 This piece was written with the financial assistance of a grant from the UK’s Economic and Social 
Research Council (number RES-000-22-2198).  I gratefully acknowledge the ESRC’s continuing 
support of my research. 
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deposits.  However, classic run on the bank dynamics are predicated upon collective 
irrationality arising from individual rationality.  Northern Rock customers were 
prepared to reclaim their savings without thought of the overall cost to the bank, 
because it was in their interests to secure their assets against any possible future 
collapse of the bank.  Moreover, under the influence of the political economy of New 
Labour, such actions were largely predictable. 
Whilst this is clearly still a process in the making, the Government has made 
significant inroads into establishing an asset-based system of welfare.  The central 
element of such a system is the reconstitution of the subjectivities of welfare 
recipients and, by extension, also of economic agents (e.g., Watson, 2008).  New 
Labour has turned the focus away from the passive receipt of state-provided welfare 
services and towards active management of assets through which individuals become 
personally responsible for releasing future income streams when welfare needs 
demand they do so (e.g., HM Treasury, 2006a).  It has attempted to instil financialized 
agents at the heart of its reforms of the British economy, encouraging individuals to 
think of themselves first and foremost as active saver-investors.  The queues of 
Northern Rock customers seeking to liberate their savings from the effects of banking 
distress were a vivid manifestation of what can happen when economic agency is 
successfully reconstituted in financialized form.  There was no way of knowing it at 
the time, but events surrounding Northern Rock have proved to be merely the first 
manifestation of the increasingly punishing feedback between distress in the mortgage 
lending and inter-bank credit markets. 
The aim of this article is to assess how the ongoing rethink of UK planning 
practice is likely to fit into a scenario of increasingly financialized economic agency.  
Will practice be recast so that planning regulations create additional investment 
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opportunities for the financialized agent?  Or will it seek to protect overall levels of 
economic activity from the pro-cyclical dynamics of active saver-investor decision-
making?  As much of the process of asset accumulation in contemporary Britain takes 
place through investments on the housing market, the house price bubble which 
coincided with New Labour’s period of office right up until the credit crunch began in 
2007 provides the substantive core of the discussion; the ongoing weakness in credit 
markets and its associated impact on house prices provides further background 
commentary. 
The article proceeds in three stages.  Section one highlights the Labour 
Government’s attempts to actively reframe economic agency in Britain within the 
context of the move towards an asset-based system of welfare.  Section two shows 
that such a strategy requires the incorporation of financialized individuals into an 
economy whose growth trajectory is increasingly influenced by asset bubbles.  
Section three concludes by investigating the implications of inserting planning 
practice into a system of asset-based welfare, by looking specifically at conditions 
evident in the British housing market as the price bubble reached its peak.  The 
discussion shows that a financialized approach to housing accentuates many of the 
social tensions revealed by the pricing trajectory of the bubble, forcing the population 
into distinct housing classes of ‘market-included’ and ‘market-excluded’ in the 
defence of housing assets already accumulated. 
 
 
Towards an Asset-Based System of Welfare in Britain 
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The idea of asset-based welfare can be traced to philosophical discussions of 
minimum income guarantees (e.g., Van Parijs, 1992).  Policies of this nature arise 
from contractarian conceptions of justice, in which it is assumed that respect for 
societal contracts originates from receipt of guaranteed access to the resources that 
enable life to be led in a dignified manner (Ackerman and Alstott, 1999).  This is 
about manufacturing consent for the prevailing structure of society.  The assumption 
is that society is comprised of instrumentally rational individuals who will accept that 
it is in their interests for society to function smoothly, so they will support minimum 
income guarantees that bind all persons to extant social norms for as long as 
contractarian conditions of justice hold. 
New Labour’s idea of asset-based welfare departs from such a conception.  It 
too assumes a world of instrumentally rational individuals, but the underlying 
philosophical framework this time is not so much one of justice as one of duty.  More 
specifically, it is of duty to oneself: to accept responsibility to take care of one’s own 
future consumption needs within the context of increasing state retreat from the arena 
of welfare provision.  The Government has promoted enhanced financial literacy 
within the population, where the knowledge being imparted focuses on the 
recognition of future welfare gaps in the absence of corrective action in the present 
(Froud et al, 2007).  This relates particularly to repeated warnings that the value of the 
state pension will increasingly fall below that which is necessary to preserve the value 
of consumption possibilities into old age (e.g., HM Treasury, 2001a).  Such warnings 
are encoded with covert moralizing that one is failing oneself if alternative means of 
protecting future consumption are not activated beyond the sphere of state provision. 
The fact is significant in itself that New Labour’s asset-based system of 
welfare comes complete with the need for individuals to reinvent their perception of 
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the state/citizen relationship.  It represents the outcome of a struggle within 
Government over the terms on which individuals would be incorporated into such a 
system (Gamble, 2008).  The radical liberal link between asset-based welfare and 
minimum income guarantees had its supporters within Cabinet but, crucially, these 
did not include Cabinet ministers with Treasury portfolios.  The Treasury view was to 
use the move to a new welfare model in order to effect a significant process of 
agential change within the British economy (see also Sherraden, 2005).  The Treasury 
view won out, ensuring that a much more conservative policy duly arose.  It 
emphasized the desirability of a self-sufficient citizenry at one stage removed from 
direct receipt of state-sponsored welfare services. 
The proffered solution begins with the individual accepting the responsibility 
to work and the further responsibility to divide the rewards from work between 
current consumption and saving for the future.  The more substantive element of the 
Government’s financial literacy drive has been oriented towards making people aware 
of the investment vehicles through which they might be able to multiply the value of 
their savings.  The intention is to continue to harbour an instrumentally rational 
approach to individuals’ financial planning, but at the same time to change their 
aspirations from being cash-rich to being asset-rich.  The greater the performance of 
the asset the more that future consumption possibilities can be expanded by its 
ownership.  A person who is fully attuned to life lived within an asset-based system of 
welfare is someone who will build up a portfolio of assets out of current savings so 
that foregone consumption possibilities in the present can be translated into future 
consumption of welfare-enhancing services.  Such people are said to be smoothing 
their consumption over the life-cycle, abstaining in part from consumption when 
income is at its highest but the demand for welfare is not, in order to expand 
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consumption at the point of the life-cycle when these features are reversed.  Assets are 
therefore to be treated as if they were stored-up labour: they provide income but break 
the contiguous temporality of the usual relationship between income and work. 
In its original form, as an element of philosophical discussions of minimum 
income guarantees, the idea of asset-based welfare contains an important element of 
economic egalitarianism (Finlayson, 2008).  This is an egalitarianism which 
emphasizes equality of outcome, and the state is used to institutionalize the 
redistributive instruments which enable everyone to receive a minimum income 
irrespective of their current earnings capacity on the labour market.  A relationship 
between the individual and the state is thus invoked whereby the individual enjoys a 
level of income guaranteed by the state solely as a condition of citizenship. 
The Government’s chosen system of asset-based welfare also has an aspect of 
economic egalitarianism to it, but in substantive terms it differs markedly from what 
has been outlined above.  For a start, its egalitarianism is not predicated upon equality 
of outcome so much as equality of opportunity.  The Government has shied away both 
from promises of unconditional access to state-sponsored income and from the very 
idea that there is anything inherently desirable about ensuring equal shares of income 
(e.g., Coates, 2005).  It acknowledges that an asset-based system of welfare revolves 
significantly around the depth of savings within society, and it limits its egalitarianism 
to providing the conditions in which equal access to developing the savings habit 
prevails (HM Treasury, 2001b).  Differential ability to finance savings out of current 
income is not a justification for redistributive interventions by the state, and neither is 
accelerating disparities in asset-ownership or in the likelihood of being able to engage 
in future welfare-enhancing consumption.  For New Labour, the sole task of the state 
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in this area is to ensure that all individuals, and especially those from poorer families, 
are able to act upon the imperative of becoming a regular saver. 
Such a stance departs quite significantly from the relationship between the 
individual and the state implied by minimum income guarantees.  Under the terms of 
that proposal, the individual only needs to be a citizen to qualify for state support: 
nothing is required in any genuinely active sense to justify continued receipt of that 
support.  For New Labour, by contrast, action is everything.  Individuals who are to 
be helped by the state to develop a portfolio of assets have first to demonstrate 
through observable behaviour that they are trying to immerse themselves in the 
savings culture (e.g., HM Treasury, 2007).  Citizenship carries no automatic 
entitlement to state support and, on its own, it counts for nothing in this instance.  
Individuals have to mould themselves instead to prescribed courses of action 
consistent with what the Government expects them to do to help themselves.  The 
ideal that they should be seeking to emulate is people who embrace the savings habit 
as an everyday act, who think of savings as the route to investment, and who invest to 
secure their long-term welfare.  Acting in this way, everyday life is reduced to an 
ongoing series of financial decisions and the individual emerges out of that life as a 
financialized agent.  The following section focuses on New Labour’s attempts to 
facilitate an economy full of financialized agents suited to the move towards an asset-
based system of welfare. 
 
 
Towards Financialized Agents in Britain 
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The financialization of everyday life occurs when active saver-investor characteristics 
displace other sources of economic identity (e.g., Martin, 2002).  With respect to 
contemporary Britain, this is clearly a tendency in the making, containing multiple 
sites of resistance, rather than a process that has already become fully embedded.  It 
involves exposing current social standing as a consumer as well as future aspirations 
for material provisioning to the pricing dynamics of asset markets.  The calculations 
associated with how to live everyday life thus come to mimic those of professional 
investors: how to treat life itself as a series of investment decisions; how to position 
the household’s assets on the right side of pricing trends; and how to plan for the long 
term by being able to continually trade-up the value of assets (see Langley, 2008). 
If this sketch appears to capture the essence of more and more people’s 
everyday economic experiences, then the very familiarity of active saver-investor 
status does not necessarily imply a benign process.  To invoke a Foucauldian image, 
financialization acts as a moral technology of control.  It depicts an ostensible logic of 
choice, as it remains a matter for the individual of whether or not to build up a 
portfolio of assets, but the actual choice involved is very one-sided. 
The flipside of the financialization of everyday life – and, in many ways, its 
cause – is the gradual withdrawal of state insurance of future income.  From 
beginnings as a strictly marginal activity perceived to be of no social worth, insurance 
itself has increasingly been ‘moralized’ (see de Goede, 2004) – i.e., it has been 
socially instituted as a necessity of responsible individual activity in a world of 
heightened risk and uncertainty.  To be insured is to adapt oneself with good sense to 
one’s surroundings, whereas to consciously remain uninsured is an act of recklessness 
which fails the moral test of prudent management of the self.  In a context of gradual 
withdrawal of state insurance of future income, anyone who does not secure their 
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future income by providing themselves with the private insurance of a portfolio of 
performing assets faces social disapprobation for their inaction.  The choice facing the 
individual under conditions of financialization is therefore between, on the one hand, 
conforming to the financialization trend by accepting that asset-ownership is merely a 
form of private insurance of future income and, on the other hand, leaving future 
welfare needs uncovered and inviting moral condemnation for doing so.  In such 
circumstances it is hardly surprising if most people with sufficient money to become 
active saver-investors opt to reconstitute their economic identities in line with the 
financialization trend, even if this involves submitting themselves to a dynamic which 
is, at heart, deeply coercive. 
In contemporary Britain, the financialization of the economic agent tends to be 
based on two substantive processes, one of which involves a changing relationship 
between the individual and the provision of pensions and the other a changing 
relationship between society and the housing market.  The former is a contextual 
factor promoting a new understanding of economic subjectivity, whilst the latter is a 
behavioural factor enabling the manifestation of active saver-investor characteristics. 
Taking them in turn, immediately on coming to office New Labour attempted 
to construct a moral platform for welfare reform based on a new political discourse of 
individuated responsible citizenry.  The aim in this respect has been to approach many 
of the ends of the previous Conservative Governments, but to use more subtle means.  
Its predecessors were content to adopt directly the language of markets and of 
taxpayer revolts in order to articulate ways of reducing the fiscal burden of state-
provided welfare.  Given its party history, such language is not as readily available to 
New Labour.  Instead, it has emphasized the necessity for individuals to take out 
adequate insurance to meet their future welfare needs and to sensitize them to the 
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responsibilities they owe to themselves for doing so.  The reality of insured 
individuals automatically draws them towards market relationships, but by focusing 
on the politics of responsibility in the act of taking out insurance the language of 
markets is not required to sustain the process. 
Consider the Myners Report on future pension provision, commissioned by 
the Brown Treasury and reporting directly to it (HM Treasury, 2001a).  It made 
headlines for its blunt assessment that the current trajectory of state-provided pensions 
is unsustainable.  Yet, whilst this was undoubtedly the main story that the Report had 
to impart, for current purposes the manner in which the telling of the story was framed 
is just as important.  The primary encoding devices in use were: (1) the image of an 
autonomous individual with choices to make about how best to confront the 
challenges of everyday life; (2) the related image of an uncertain future – what 
Anthony Giddens (1991: 7-10) generically has called ‘ontological insecurity’ – which 
requires the individual to be forward-thinking and to coordinate lifetime income flows 
to meeting future eventualities; (3) the assertion of the moral propriety of insurance as 
a social technology designed to counteract the tendency towards ontological security; 
and (4) the use of doomsday forecasting to shift the burden of pension responsibility 
from the state to the individual.  The Myners Report is liberally inflected with the 
social ideology of financialization, and it should be viewed in its own right as an 
important part of the trend towards financialized economic agency in New Labour’s 
Britain. 
Whenever state retreat in pension provision is foreshadowed, it is 
accompanied by the expressed opinion that the prudent person would in any case be 
building up an asset base to provide the ontological security of known future income 
streams, whether the factor of state retreat is evident or not.  That injunction plays up 
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to what Gordon Brown (2006) has referred to, in complimentary terms, as the “new 
individualism of rising aspirations”.  The argument is this: that even were the current 
value of the state pension to be defended forever, it is both right and commendable for 
every generation to want to enjoy a greater level of material comfort in old age than 
its predecessors; therefore, the state pension can never be enough on its own to satisfy 
continually rising expectations.  New Labour has thus implored everyone to turn their 
attention to enhancing asset ownership.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that around 
40% of aggregate accumulated wealth in Britain is already concentrated in owning the 
family home (HM Treasury, 2000: 4), the housing market has become the lynchpin of 
this process. 
Public housing formed one element of state insurance of future income within 
the post-war British welfare state (e.g., Ford and Wilcox, 1998).  Those who were 
able to satisfy their own housing needs through private markets were compensated in 
other ways for helping to maintain the fiscal basis of a public housing system on 
which they had no call.  In particular, this came in the form of significant mortgage 
interest tax relief, which pushed the effective cost of owner-occupation well below the 
market rate (Malpass, 1996).  This dual system of housing subsidization channelled 
individuals into distinct housing classes for much of the post-war period, whereby 
existing social stratification provided people with a route into a particular housing 
class and the process of being embedded within a particular housing class served 
further to institutionalize the social stratification (e.g., Wilding, 1997).  There was a 
marked absence of mobility between the two housing classes, because both were 
dependent for their tenure on incorporation into a state-provided system of welfare 
(e.g., Cronin, 2004). 
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The move under New Labour to state retreat in pension provision and towards 
an asset-based system of welfare would clearly have unsettled this relationship had it 
still existed, but the reframing of the idea of housing rights in the 1980s had in any 
case brought about its demise.  Within the context of the post-war British welfare 
state, housing was treated as a merit good.  As such, it was assumed that everyone had 
a right to affordable housing and that it was the responsibility of the state to ensure 
that this right could be satisfied.  However, the politics of the 1980s challenged the 
notion of housing as a merit good and strove to replace it with the notion of housing 
as a private investment vehicle.  Echoing this shift, the right to housing as a universal 
commitment to individuals for living life within society was transformed into the right 
to make money out of successful trading up on the housing market.  This also changed 
the role of the state from direct securing of distinct patterns of housing tenure to 
securing a macroeconomic environment in which mortgage lending conditions 
produce continual upward pressure on house prices (e.g., Watson, 2008). 
The stability culture championed by New Labour has had notable success in 
achieving this aim, with house prices increasing pretty much continuously in Britain 
throughout the Government’s first ten years in power.  This has been accompanied by 
the rise in popular culture of ‘home improvement’, where the underlying rationale is 
to demonstrate how every last penny of value can be wrung out of a house.  Taken 
together, these trends have changed how many people view their homes.  No longer is 
the instinctive reaction necessarily that the home is the arena for nurturing family 
relationships in a fundamentally private forum.  Instead, it is just as likely that the 
home will be viewed as a quasi-public space, at least insofar as it is merely one 
component of the housing market.  Under the influence of financialized agency, the 
home is only ever one decision away from being placed on the open market, and 
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consequently it is desired equally as much for its potential as a high performance asset 
as for being the space for living family life. 
The article concludes by considering the implications for planning of the 
increasing tendency to view the privately-owned family home through the perspective 
of financialized economic subjectivities.  It also reviews how those implications have 
changed to reflect the Government’s changing priorities for the housing market in the 
wake of the credit crunch beginning in 2007 and the subsequent record-breaking one-
year fall in house prices in 2008. 
 
 
UK Planning in the Context of the Financialization of Everyday Life 
 
From its earliest days in office, New Labour has declared its interest in ‘joined-up 
government’ (Clark, 2002).  Its stated desire in this respect has been to move away 
from making policies on a one-by-one basis, for fear that the introduction of one such 
policy might change the context in which another policy operates so decisively that it 
undermines any chance of that policy being successful.  Instead, coordination across 
policy areas has been the goal, requiring the thought process to be oriented towards a 
complete package of reforms rather than in terms of individual policies (e.g., 
Bogdanor, 2005).  This makes it likely that planning practice will be considered 
relative to the general thrust of policy, rather than as a case on its own. 
The institutional mechanism through which this change in policy-making style 
has been facilitated is the increasing scope of the Treasury to intervene in the 
activities of other government departments.  The more that the Treasury has been 
allowed to extend its reach, the more that the policy-making process as a whole takes 
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on the appearance of a single web with the Treasury at its centre (e.g., Buller and 
Flinders, 2005).  The outcome might well be more consistency across different policy 
outputs, but it is also likely that all policies will be inflected with a clear stamp of 
Treasury preference.  As the tendencies towards an asset-based system of welfare and 
towards financialized economic subjectivities both have their origins in Treasury 
policy, they are increasingly likely to be the standard against which other policies are 
judged for their viability.  Purely from a policy-making perspective, then, a likely 
scenario for future planning practice is one in which it is not only consistent with the 
move towards an asset-based system of welfare and the financialization of everyday 
life, but also serves to add extra gusto to it. 
Interview evidence gathered from some of those who were close to the process 
does indeed suggest that the Barker Review of Land Use Planning was both Treasury-
inspired and Treasury-led (personal correspondence with Andrew Inch).  The Review 
contained a substantial commentary on the housing market (HM Treasury, 2006b), 
which in turn built upon an even lengthier treatment in the Barker Review of Housing 
Supply (HM Treasury, 2004).  Taken together, the two reviews do nothing to 
decisively refute the suggestion that New Labour deliberately manipulated the house 
price bubble which coincided with its first ten years in office.  Certainly, the 
Treasury’s preference for using the housing market as a means of social reform 
remains intact as a result of the recommendations of the final reports. 
A survey at the end of December 2008 by the Nationwide building society 
showed that the average house price in the UK was £153,000 (BBC News, 06.01.09).  
This was down from the October 2007 peak of £182,000, which itself represented the 
culmination of an average annual rise of 12% between 1997 and 2007.  As a 
consequence of such increases, for the proportion of the population who have been 
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able to turn savings into assets, the home is now most people’s prime asset.  The 
house price trajectory of its first decade in office provided New Labour with its main 
means of incorporating individuals into an asset-based system of welfare and from 
there of warding off political mobilization for other forms of welfare provision.  The 
whole of the Government’s macroeconomic agenda – ‘sound money’, ‘credibility’, 
‘business first’ – would begin to look increasingly fragile if concerted pressure were 
brought to bear through the political process for renewed effort towards direct state 
provision of welfare. 
However, it is important not to run too far ahead of the argument, because 
events have subsequently intervened to force at least a partial rethink onto 
Government priorities for the housing market.  The foregoing continues to capture the 
overall logic of the Government’s approach, but a comparison between before and 
after the credit crunch becomes instructive.  The baseline for the comparison is the 
autumn of 2007, when the first signs emerged that the banking sector distress arising 
from the fallout of that summer’s world credit crunch would feed through into 
housing market distress in the UK. 
Throughout 2008, the Government was able to find massive amounts of public 
money to enact interventions designed to pre-empt and therefore to militate against 
the worst effects of impending recession.  Almost without exception these 
interventions contravened its previously stipulated ‘golden rules’ for keeping its 
macroeconomic agenda on course.  At the time of writing it is still too early to say 
whether this amounts to a decisive change of direction, but there are reasons for 
thinking that this is unlikely to be the case – not the least of which being the 
Government’s own insistence that its interventions are temporary measures until 
normal order is restored in the economy (BBC News, 19.12.08).  For the purposes of 
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my argument, moreover, it is worthwhile noting that changes to the tax system have 
not been linked with the return to old-style public welfare provision.  They have been 
used simply as stimuli for levels of consumption activity which might enable the real 
economy to remain buoyant and to remain an arena in which asset accumulation is a 
viable expectation. 
New Labour’s long-term priority for the housing market before the onset of 
the credit crunch had been asset accumulation designed to drive the move towards a 
system of asset-based welfare, and its emergency economic measures introduced 
throughout 2008 do not appear to undermine that priority.  Issues of affordability and 
the need to balance asset accumulation with ensuring access for new participants in 
the housing market were being discussed by planners before the onset of the credit 
crunch but elicited no sustained public comment by the Government.  Since the 
autumn of 2007, though, the long-term priority has also been conjoined with explicit 
Government recognition of the competing short-term priority of improving 
homeownership affordability as a means of withstanding the potential for an outright 
market collapse.  This has been designed in order to maintain the inflow of buyers 
necessary to prevent the mortgage lending market from temporarily seizing up and 
therefore to prevent even larger falls in house prices than currently predicted from 
spilling over into a deeper recession in the real economy.  Mortgage providers reacted 
to the revelations about subprime lending by tightening the terms on which mortgages 
were made available in an attempt to prove that their business was built on solid 
foundations.  Yet, the scaling back of loan-to-value ratio forced many potential 
homebuyers out of the mortgage lending market and further depressed prices as a 
consequence. 
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The long-term strategy requires continual increases in house prices so that 
mortgage debt can be more than counter-balanced by higher levels of housing market 
wealth.  The short-term strategy was initially enacted when the first reports came out 
from the UK Council of Mortgage Lenders predicting a plateau in house prices at 
their 2007 level for the whole of 2008 (BBC News, 11.12.07).  But since then the 
predictions have become much more pessimistic.  By June 2008, HBOS, the UK’s 
largest mortgage lender, predicted that the overall value of the housing market would 
fall by 9% in 2008 and for it to take up to four years for house price growth to kick in 
again (BBC News, 19.06.07).  The same report estimated that the volume of UK 
mortgage transactions in 2008 would be down 45% from twelve months previously, 
which seemed set to accentuate the downward pressure on prices still further.  
Subsequent events proved even these revised estimates to be too optimistic.  At the 
time of writing the most up-to-date figures are for the end of 2008.  These showed an 
annual fall of 15.9% for average house prices (or 18% from the October 2007 peak), 
and an annual fall of over 60% in the volume of mortgage lending (BBC News, 
06.01.09).  The balance between the Government’s long-term and short-term housing 
market priorities has become more pronounced in favour of the latter the more that it 
has been faced with increasingly gloomy predictions about the likely pricing trend. 
The planning process is now being inserted into a political context in which 
the new emphasis is on avoiding an affordability crisis in the interests of inserting 
price floors into a falling market.  Yet, in effect this is merely to shut the stable door 
after the horse has bolted.  It is true that affordability statistics continue to make for 
sobering reading, but it would be wrong to attribute them to the impact of the credit 
crunch and the associated perception of individuals feeling less well off.  Moreover, it 
would also be wrong to assume that planning practice alone can cure current 
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affordability problems.  Those problems have long-term roots which relate to the 
gradual eclipse over thirty years and more of a cultural politics of housing which 
treated the guarantee of access to housing as a social right (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 
2008).  The shift to viewing housing as an investment good has had a noticeable 
impact on the amount and type of financing available for building houses.  Private 
financial institutions have concentrated on making increasing amounts of commercial 
credit available to the private market, whilst the government has systematically 
withdrawn state credit from public housing.  The numbers collapse in new homes is 
almost solely a public housing phenomenon, and the affordability figures currently 
reflect the imbalance between private and public housing (National Housing and 
Planning Advice Unit, 2007).  Correcting that imbalance is not in the gift of planners, 
because it is linked to changes in the cultural politics of housing and, in turn, to 
broader social changes enacted since the 1970s. 
The proportion of take-home pay required to service mortgage repayments – 
the measure traditionally used to assess housing market ‘affordability’ – has increased 
rapidly from a figure of just over 25% in 2003, where it had been more or less 
continuously for the previous decade, to one of 42% at the peak of the house price 
bubble in 2007.  The only other time it has breeched the 40% barrier was for the 
period between 1990 and 1992 during the collapse of the previous UK housing market 
bubble (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 2007).  That collapse precipitated 
an economic recession which hit homeowners particularly hard (Taylor and Bradley, 
1994).  The proportion of take-home pay required to cover the up-front costs 
associated with house purchases – the measure of housing market ‘inaccessibility’ – 
has risen even more dramatically than the affordability figure which concentrates on 
mortgage repayments.  This peaked at just under 60% during the house price bubble 
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of the 1980s, fell steadily to around 20% by the time New Labour came to power in 
1997, but topped 100% for the first time in 2004 and hovered around that figure for 
the duration of the most recent bubble (Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors, 
2007). 
A functioning asset-based system of welfare can be expected to survive for the 
long term only if continual access into it is guaranteed from one generation to the 
next.  Yet, recent figures for housing market affordability and accessibility are 
strongly suggestive of the possibility that distinct housing classes of ‘market-
included’ and ‘market-excluded’ have been institutionalized in the defence of 
previously accumulated housing assets.  We can already see evidence of clear 
distributional tensions between those who have secured access into the system of 
asset-based welfare via the housing market and those seeking such access.  The 
former group have an interest in the Government continuing to press ahead with its 
unchecked long-term strategy for housing market asset accumulation and the 
associated encouragement of bubble dynamics in house prices.  By contrast, the latter 
group have an interest in the Government emphasizing the short-term strategy for 
improving homeownership affordability and the associated encouragement of price 
stability.  The route to protecting the gains already made in the move towards an 
asset-based system of welfare passes through the interests of the market-included.  
However, avoiding a more dramatic collapse in house prices on the back of the falls 
from autumn 2007 to the time of writing currently looks as though it entails 
prioritizing the interests of the market-excluded. 
New Labour could now find itself on the horns of a dilemma, where the long-
term and short-term needs of the agential change it wishes to impose on the British 
economy require very different types of intervention into the housing market.  This is 
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something that it has acknowledged for some time, making the identification of the 
credit crunch of summer 2007 in one sense a bit of a false benchmark.  What is 
different today, however, is the explicit emphasis which is placed on affordability 
issues in a bid to bolster flagging prices.  This has given it a prominence in public 
debates which it has not previously enjoyed.  Yet, the tension on which it is built – 
how to maintain existing asset values concentrated in homeownership whilst nurturing 
the expectation that the experience of homeownership could be made available to all – 
has a longer-standing place in the Party’s thinking.  Indeed, the stated premise of the 
Barker Review of Housing Supply (HM Treasury, 2004) was how best to make 
planning for housing more sensitive to spatial concentrations of demand as a way of 
avoiding exclusionary pricing dynamics. 
The Government has recognized that the next generation of aspiring asset-
holders will be excluded from accumulation dynamics on the housing market unless 
affordable housing becomes more widely available (HM Treasury, 2006a).  It 
continues to use the language of inclusion when talking about its hopes for the 
housing market’s future.  In this way it presents itself as defending the drive for 
‘aspiration’ and its spread throughout society.  The Government’s recent turn towards 
concerns for affordability suggests that it is not prepared to knowingly frustrate the 
interests of the market-excluded by simply following the interests of the market-
included.  However, question marks remain about what it can do to correct the 
ongoing imbalance between private and public housing even if it is of a mind to 
intervene along such lines (and this is currently a big ‘if’).  Interventions consciously 
promoted as intended to make housing more affordable serve only to raise the 
prospects of political unpopularity as those with assets accumulated in the housing 
market look to the government to help them maximize their gains. 
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New Labour’s attempts to balance potentially incompatible long-term and 
short-term priorities have led to an increasingly ad hoc approach to housing market 
matters.  There are definitely moves in Government circles away from the desire to 
embed an extreme version of a fully financialized future for those who have already 
secured access onto the housing market.  This allows for the needs of the current 
market-excluded to be recognized.  Yvette Cooper, Minister of State for Housing and 
Planning in the Department for Communities and Local Government, announced in 
September 2007 a crackdown on the ‘empty home plots’ phenomenon (Financial 
Times, 13.09.07).  Property developers have shown themselves to be more than 
willing to play the housing market to their own advantage, by winning planning 
permission but then hoarding empty building plots to increase the value of their other 
developments in nearby locations.  This clearly intensifies both supply constraints and 
the upward trajectory of prices in the context of bubble dynamics, but it also 
intensifies affordability constraints.  In this instance, the Government backed the 
cause of the housing market-excluded rather than treating the bubble as the exclusive 
goal of policy, and this took place even before the fallout of the world credit crunch 
began to distress the housing market.  The suggestion remains, though, that this was 
nothing more than a one-off intervention designed to quell a specific concern being 
voiced by the media rather than an element of a fully operational programme for 
restructuring the housing market in line with the needs of the market-excluded. 
The evidence against this forming part of a fully operational programme 
comes in the Government’s continued tolerance of the effects of the ‘buy-to-let’ 
sector, even when those effects work in the opposite direction to other aspects of its 
housing market policy and when they can be shown to have been a powerful 
propelling force for the recent house price bubble.  Very soon after Cooper struck out 
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against the empty home plots phenomenon, specialist builders in city centre 
developments reported to the stock market plans to mothball until further notice 
already acquired city centre sites (Guardian, 18.11.07).  The difficulties experienced 
by most banks in the aftermath of the credit crunch in the summer of 2007 led to a 
retrenchment of their mortgage lending business, a contraction of demand by 
borrowers seeking to invest in the buy-to-let sector, increased problems for developers 
trying to sell new properties in that sector and an increased reluctance to begin the 
next phase of their developments whilst existing stock remained unsold.  The whole 
buy-to-let dynamic has proved to be something of a double-edged sword for the 
Government’s broader trajectory of reform.  It provides an ideal route for many 
already market-included families to expand their asset base through purchasing a 
second property.  Yet, the effect of the buy-to-let sector in increasing housing demand 
at a higher rate than housing supply has led to price dynamics which have ratcheted 
up affordability problems and left many potential first-time buyers without access to 
asset accumulation via the housing market. 
Although the Government has sat on its hands in relation to the buy-to-let 
sector, it has shown a more interventionist side in tackling one aspect of housing 
market exclusion through the Key Worker Living programme (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2006).  This has been designed to ensure that 
people employed in frontline public service delivery – especially in the areas of 
healthcare and education – are not put off remaining in that employment because their 
salaries act as a barrier to entry onto the housing market.  Direct subsidization of 
property purchases by key workers – at the time of writing to the tune of nearly £¾ 
billion – has been encouraged in order to keep them in their jobs.  As yet, though, 
there has been no attempt to extend this programme to a general principle in order to 
 24 
induce a more socially inclusive accumulation of housing market assets across the 
market-excluded population as a whole.  Whilst doing so would clearly widen the 
scope of asset accumulation amongst the population, doing so specifically through 
broad-based intervention in the housing market might begin to devalue other people’s 
assets already accumulated there. 
New Labour might continue to insist that there is no ‘either/or’ choice to be 
made in this respect, but its own increasingly ad hoc approach to policy appears to 
undermine the claim.  What emerges is an increasingly patchwork approach to 
housing market policy which lacks a coherent central thread in terms of a single 
underlying organizational principle.  It is such an approach into which the planning 
process now has to be incorporated, and the lack of internal coherence threatens to 





It is, of course, too early to draw definitive conclusions about the impact on UK 
planning of: (1) the Barker Reviews; (2) the broader trend towards the financialization 
of everyday life which forms the backdrop to the Reviews; and (3) the fallout from 
the world credit crunch which, for the time being at least, has temporarily appeared to 
alter the Government’s priorities surrounding the financialization trend.  In many 
ways, though, the current article is not about conclusions, so much as identifying 
important contextual factors that will have an effect on UK planning in the future.  
Given its significance for so many aspects of the British economy, the housing market 
will continue to form a crucial part of the backdrop to the planning process, and for 
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some time to come the important contextual factors for the housing market will be the 
three identified at the start of this paragraph. 
As the recent Northern Rock bank run demonstrates only too clearly, large 
sections of the British population now recognize the move towards an asset-based 
system of welfare as an integral part of their everyday life.  No amount of carefully 
scripted Government assurances or eminent economic opinion was sufficient to 
prevent mass deposit withdrawals because the perception had taken hold that 
privately-owned assets, in the form of individual savings, were at risk.  Those 
Northern Rock investors who chose to liquidate their remaining savings in the bank 
did so precisely because they took seriously New Labour’s constant reiteration of the 
plea for individuals to accumulate their own personal portfolio of assets. 
It is surely more than coincidence that this event centred on one of the 
mainstays of Britain’s mortgage lending business, because the housing market is now 
an essential ingredient of the move towards an asset-based system of welfare.  Yet, 
the accompanying financialization trend threatens to intensify social contradictions 
that were already evident in the pricing trajectory of the housing market.  What we do 
not know yet is the extent to which planning practice will be required to manage the 
negative externalities arising from the financialization process in terms of the 
distributional tensions between the housing market-excluded and the market-included.  
Uneven access to asset bubbles creates new forms of social stratification, thus 
introducing potential political sites of conflict within the existing economic order.  In 
addition, asset bubbles inflate in a clearly pro-cyclical manner and when they burst – 
as is presumably happening at the moment – they have a tendency to drag the whole 
of the economy down with them.  The current distress of the British retail sector and 
the move into administration of many of the country’s best-known firms – 
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Woolworths, Wedgwood, MFI, Zavvi, etc. – appears to exemplify such a trend.  We 
also do not know the extent to which planning practice will be required to deal with 
the wholly novel negative externalities arising from a dramatically falling housing 
market in the context of broader financialization dynamics. 
Planning practice on its own cannot resolve these issues, although it might 
nonetheless be called on as part of a tidying-up operation in the event of clear 
fractures opening up in housing market policy.  This is not likely to be something for 
the planning profession to celebrate.  The housing market cannot be used to propel a 
universal move towards a system of asset-based welfare in the context of deep-seated 
exclusion from it.  But neither is popular legitimacy for the Government’s broader 
financialization strategy likely to be maintained if the Government intervenes to 
deliberately lessen affordability constraints in the context of already falling house 
prices, knowing that this will destroy wealth already accumulated in homeownership.  
The increasingly ad hoc nature of New Labour’s housing market policy provides 
evidence that the tensions in its approach are already beginning to bite, and planning 
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